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Resilient Continuous-Time Consensus in Fractional Robust Networks
Heath J. LeBlanc,1 Haotian Zhang,2 Shreyas Sundaram,2 and Xenofon Koutsoukos3
Abstract— In this paper, we study the continuous-time con-
sensus problem in the presence of adversaries. The networked
multi-agent system is modeled as a switched system, where
the normal agents have integrator dynamics and the switching
signal determines the topology of the network. We consider
several models of omniscient adversaries under the assumption
that at most a fraction of any normal agent’s neighbors may be
adversaries. Under this fractional assumption on the interaction
between normal and adversary agents, we show that a novel
graph theoretic metric, called fractional robustness, is useful
for analyzing the network topologies under which the normal
agents achieve consensus.
I. INTRODUCTION
Large-scale networks are ubiquitous in nature (e.g., flocks
of birds or schools of fish) and are becoming increasingly
more pervasive in engineered systems (e.g., large-scale sen-
sor networks). For these systems, reaching consensus in a
distributed manner is fundamental to coordination and is
therefore a common objective in applications ranging from
clock synchronization in sensor networks [1] to flocking [2].
However, large-scale distributed systems are susceptible to
malicious attacks and failures. If a security breach occurs,
many consensus algorithms fail to achieve consensus, and
are therefore not resilient [3].
Fault-tolerant and resilient consensus algorithms have been
studied extensively over the years [4], [5], particularly in the
presence of Byzantine nodes under the assumption that at
most F of the nodes are compromised [6]. Byzantine nodes
are deceptive, can behave arbitrarily within the limitations set
by the model of computation, and may be viewed as adver-
sarial in nature. Many of the resilient consensus algorithms
studied in the literature are computationally expensive and
require at least some global information. However, a class
of computationally efficient resilient consensus algorithms
that use only local information are developed in [7] and
[8], referred to as the Mean-Subsequence-Reduced (MSR)
algorithms [8]. The idea behind the MSR algorithms is
simple: under the assumption that at most F nodes fail, each
normal node removes the largest and smallest F values (i.e.,
the extreme values) in its neighborhood and takes the average
from a subset of the remaining values. MSR algorithms have
been used extensively to achieve fault tolerant and resilient
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consensus (e.g., in clock synchronization [1] and robot gath-
ering [9]). However, the network topological condition for
characterizing convergence has long been an open problem.
Recently, it has been shown that traditional graph theoretic
metrics (such as connectivity) are inadequate for characteriz-
ing the conditions under which the MSR algorithms achieve
resilient consensus [10], [11]. Because of the removal of
extreme values in MSR algorithms, a property that encapsu-
lates the notion of sufficient local redundancy of incoming
information is needed. This idea is captured by network
robustness [10], [12] and a similar property studied in [13].
Equipped with these properties, the necessary and sufficient
conditions for convergence of a class of MSR algorithms
have been given for the Byzantine model [13] and for a local
broadcast version of the Byzantine model [12] (referred to as
the malicious adversary), under the assumption that at most
F nodes are compromised.
In this paper, we continue our study of continuous-time
versions of MSR algorithms [11], [12], [14]. We study both
malicious and Byzantine adversaries, along with the crash
adversary, which is inspired by the crash faulty robots in
robot gathering [9] and is similar to the fault attack model of
[15]. Instead of assuming an absolute bound on the number
of compromised nodes in a normal node’s neighborhood, we
assume at most a fraction of nodes f may be compromised
in the neighborhood. This fractional assumption accounts
for the degree of influence on the nodes in the network.
We adapt the continuous-time MSR algorithm, referred to as
the Adversarial Robust Consensus Protocol (ARC-P) [11],
[12], [14], to the fractional assumption. To analyze ARC-
P under the fractional adversary assumption, we consider a
fractional form of robustness, introduced in [16], and prove
separate necessary and sufficient conditions under each of the
adversary models. The necessary condition is stated in terms
of time-invariant network topology, whereas the sufficient
condition applies to time-varying network topologies that are
sufficiently robust under a dwell time assumption. The main
contribution of this paper is the continuous-time analysis
under the fractional scope of threat assumption with the
Byzantine, malicious, and crash adversary models.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM
FORMULATION
Consider a time-varying network modeled by the digraph
D(t) = (V , E(t)), where V = {1, ..., n} is the node (agent)
set and E(t) ⊂ V × V is the directed edge set at time t.
Without loss of generality, the node set is partitioned into
a set of N normal agents N = {1, 2, . . . , N} and a set
of M adversary agents A = {N + 1, N + 2, . . . , n}, with
M = n−N . Each directed edge (j, i) ∈ E(t) indicates that
node i can be influenced by node j at time t. In this case,
we say that agent j conveys information to agent i. The sets
of in-neighbors and out-neighbors of node i at time t are
defined by N ini (t) = {j ∈ V : (j, i) ∈ E(t)} and N outi (t) =
{j ∈ V : (i, j) ∈ E(t)}, respectively. The set of all digraphs
on n nodes is denoted by Γn = {D1, . . . ,Dd}.
The time-varying topology of the network is governed by a
piecewise constant switching signal σ : R≥0 → {1, . . . , d}.
At each point in time t, σ(t) dictates the topology of the
network, and σ is continuous from the right everywhere.
In order to emphasize the role of the switching signal, we
denote Dσ(t) = D(t). Note that time-invariant networks are
represented by simply dropping the dependence on time t.
The agents share state information with one another ac-
cording to the topology of the network. Each normal agent’s
state (or value) at time t is denoted as xi(t) ∈ R. In order to
handle deceptive adversaries, we let x(j,i)(t) denote the state
of agent j intended for agent i at time t. For consistency
of notation, we define x(j,i)(t) for all j, i ∈ V , even if
(j, i) /∈ E(t). In the case that j ∈ N is normal, we define
x(j,i)(t) ≡ xj(t) (and in particular, x(j,j)(t) ≡ xj(t)). With
this terminology, we denote the collective states of all agents
in N , A, and V intended for agent i by
x(N ,i)(t) = [x1(t), . . . , xN (t)]
T ∈ RN ,
x(A,i)(t) = [x(N+1,i)(t), . . . , x(n,i)(t)]
T ∈ RM ,
and
x(V,i)(t) = [x(1,i)(t), . . . , x(n,i)(t)]
T ∈ Rn,
respectively. Since x(N ,i)(t) ≡ x(N ,j)(t) for all i, j ∈ V ,
we unambiguously define xN (t) = x(N ,i)(t) for any i ∈
V . Finally, we denote the vector containing all adversary
states intended for the normal agents by x(A,N )(t) =
[xT(A,1)(t), . . . , x
T
(A,N)(t)]
T ∈ RMN .
A. Normal Agent Dynamics
Each normal agent i ∈ N has scalar state xi(t) ∈ R
and integrator dynamics given by x˙i = ui, where ui =
fi,σ(t)(t, xN , x(A,i)) is a control input. Because there is no
prior knowledge about which agents are adversaries, the con-
trol input must treat the state information from neighboring
agents in the same manner. The system of normal agents are
then defined for t ∈ R≥0 by
x˙N (t) = fσ(t)(t, xN , x(A,N )), xN (0) ∈ R
N ,Dσ(t) ∈ Γn,
(1)
where fσ(t)(·) = [f1,σ(t)(·), . . . , fN,σ(t)(·)]T. Note that for
existence of solutions on R≥0, the fi,σ(t)(·)’s must be
bounded and piecewise continuous with respect to the ad-
versaries’ trajectories. These functions should be designed a
priori so that the normal agents can reach consensus without
prior knowledge about the identities of the adversaries.
B. Adversary Model
The adversary model studied in this paper has two aspects:
the threat model and the scope of threat assumption.
1) Threat Model: The threat model defines the types of
behaviors allowed by individual adversary nodes. The least
general threat is the crash adversary, which is inspired by the
crash fault studied in mobile robotics [9]. As a fault model,
crash-faulty robots fail by simply stopping. Analogously, a
crash adversary behaves normally until it is crashed and once
crashed, stops changing its state. The crash adversary deter-
mines when the node is crashed, but otherwise cannot modify
the state of the compromised agent or the values conveyed
to other nodes. Crash adversaries – like all adversary models
studied here – are assumed to be omniscient (i.e., they know
all other states and the full network topology; they are aware
of the update rules fi,σ(t)(·), ∀i ∈ N ; they are aware of
which other agents are adversaries; and they know the plans
of the other adversaries1). For this reason, the worst case
crash times for the adversaries should be considered. This
behavior is summarized in the following definition.
Definition 1 (Crash Adversary): An agent k ∈ A is a
crash adversary (or simply crash node) if it is omniscient,
and there exists tk ∈ R≥0 (selected by the adversary), such
that
• agent k behaves normally before t = tk, according to
its prescribed update rule, i.e.,
x˙k = fk,σ(t)(t, xN , x(A,k)) for all t < tk;
• agent k stops changing its state for all t ≥ tk, i.e.,
xk(t) = xk(tk) for all t ≥ tk;
• agent k conveys the same state to each out-neighbor,
i.e., x(k,i) ≡ x(k,j) for all i, j ∈ N outk .
The crash adversary is similar to the fault attack model
described in [15]. The fault attack assumes that the state of
the attacked node remains constant, as with a crashed node;
however, the constant value imposed by the attack may be
arbitrary instead of being fixed at the state value immediately
before the attack.
Conversely, the most general threat studied here is the
Byzantine adversary. The Byzantine adversary is motivated
by Byzantine faulty nodes studied in distributed comput-
ing [4], [6], communication networks [5], [17], and mobile
robotics [9]. Byzantine nodes may behave arbitrarily (under
a continuity constraint), are omniscient, and are capable of
duplicity, i.e., the values conveyed to their out-neighbors are
not necessarily the same.
The malicious adversary is essentially a Byzantine node
restricted to a local broadcast model of communication. A
malicious adversary may behave arbitrarily and is omni-
scient. However, malicious nodes are incapable of duplicity,
i.e., every out-neighbor receives the same information.
Malicious nodes have been studied in the detection and
identification of misbehaving nodes in discrete-time linear
consensus networks [18], [19]. In these works, a malicious
node is modeled by introducing a disturbance on its input
that allows the malicious node to modify its state arbitrarily.
1One may take the viewpoint that a centralized omniscient adversary
informs and directs the behavior of the individual adversary agents.
To identify the malicious nodes, normal nodes use nonlo-
cal topological information concerning the (time-invariant)
network to ‘invert’ the consensus dynamics of the network.
A technical assumption for malicious and Byzantine
agents deals with the continuity of the state trajectories
of the adversaries. Technically, piecewise continuity of the
trajectories of x(A,N )(t) (combined with certain regularity
conditions on fσ(t)(·)) is sufficient for existence of solutions
to (1). However, the trajectories of the normal agents are con-
tinuous; therefore, it is feasible that normal agents could use
discontinuities in the state trajectories to detect adversaries.
Thus, we restrict the trajectories of Byzantine adversaries
to be continuous for all t. The behavior of Byzantine and
malicious agents are summarized as follows.
Definition 2 (Byzantine and Malicious Agents): An agent
k ∈ A is a Byzantine or malicious adversary if it is
omniscient, and
• agent k’s state trajectories intended for other nodes,
{x(k,i)(t) : i ∈ V}, are continuous functions of time
on [0,∞);
• Byzantine agent k’s state trajectory intended for i may
be different than the one intended for j, i.e., x(k,i)(t) 6=
x(k,j)(t) is allowed for some i, j ∈ V ;
• malicious agent k’s state trajectory intended for i must
be the same as the one intended for j, i.e., x(k,i)(t) ≡
x(k,j)(t), ∀i, j ∈ V .
2) Scope of Threats: The scope of threat model defines
the topological assumptions placed on the adversaries. To
account for varying degrees of different nodes, we introduce
a fault model that considers an upper bound on the fraction
of adversaries in any node’s neighborhood. This is called the
f -fraction local model.
Definition 3 (f -Fraction Local Set and Threat Model):
A set S ⊂ V is f -fraction local if and only if it contains at
most a fraction f of agents in the neighborhood of the other
agents for all t, i.e., |N ini (t)
⋂
S| ≤ ⌊f |N ini (t)|⌋, ∀i ∈ V \S,
f ∈ [0, 1]. The f -fraction local model refers to the case
when the set of adversaries is an f -fraction local set.
It should be emphasized that in time-varying network
topologies, the property defining an f -fraction local set must
hold for all points in time. The f -fraction local model is
inspired from ideas pertaining to contagion in social and
economic networks [20], where a node accepts some new
information (behavior or technology) if more than a certain
fraction of its neighbors has adopted it. A scope of threat
model similar to the f -fraction local model is proposed in [1]
for hierarchical networks to address the problem of resilient
clock synchronization in the presence of Byzantine nodes.
C. Resilient Asymptotic Consensus
The Continuous-Time Resilient Asymptotic Consensus
(CTRAC) problem is a continuous-time analogue to the
Byzantine approximate agreement problem [4], [7], and is
defined as follows. The quantities MN (t) and mN (t) are
the maximum and minimum values of the normal agents at
time t, respectively.
Definition 4 (CTRAC): The normal agents are said to
achieve continuous-time resilient asymptotic consensus
(CTRAC) in the presence of adversary agents (given a
particular adversary model) if
(i) ∃L ∈ R such that limt→∞ xi(t) = L for all i ∈ N ;
(ii) xi(t) ∈ I0 = [mN (0),MN (0)], ∀t ∈ R≥0, i ∈ N ,
for any choice of initial values xN (0) ∈ RN .
The CTRAC problem is defined by two conditions, agree-
ment and safety, along with the type of adversary considered.
Condition (i) is an agreement condition that requires the
states of the normal agents to converge to a common limit,
the consensus value, despite the influence of the adversaries.
The safety condition in (ii) ensures that the value chosen
by each normal agent lies within the range of ‘good’ values.
This is important in safety critical applications, whenever I0
is a known safe set.
III. RESILIENT CONSENSUS ALGORITHM
Linear consensus algorithms have been extensively studied
in the control community for the last few years [21]. In such
strategies, at time t, each node senses or receives information
from its neighbors, and changes its value according to the
Linear Consensus Protocol (LCP):
x˙i(t) =
∑
j∈N in
i
(t)
w(j,i)(t)
(
x(j,i)(t)− xi(t)
)
, (2)
where x(j,i)(t) − xi(t) is the relative state of agent j with
respect to agent i and w(j,i)(t) is a piecewise continuous
weight assigned to the relative state at time t.
Different conditions have been reported in the literature to
ensure that asymptotic consensus is reached [2], [22], [23].
It is common to assume that the weights are nonnegative,
uniformly bounded, and piecewise continuous. That is, there
exist constants α, β ∈ R>0, with β ≥ α, such that the
following conditions hold:
• w(j,i)(t) = 0 whenever j 6∈ N ini (t), ∀i ∈ N , t ∈ R≥0;
• α ≤ w(j,i)(t) ≤ β, ∀j ∈ N
in
i (t), i ∈ N , t ∈ R≥0.
One problem with LCP given in (2) is that it is not resilient
to misbehaving nodes. In fact, it is shown in [2], [3] that a
single ‘leader’ node can cause all agents to reach consensus
on an arbitrary value of its choosing simply by holding its
value constant.
A. Description of ARC-P with Parameter f
The Adversarial Robust Consensus Protocol (ARC-P) with
parameter F ∈ Z≥0 was introduced in [14] and extended
in [12] to deal with the F -total and F -local scope of
threat models. By removing the extreme values with respect
to the node’s own value (the F largest and F smallest
values), ARC-P with parameter F is able to achieve resilient
asymptotic consensus [12]. Under the f -fraction local model,
a minor modification to this protocol is needed. In this
case, the parameter f ∈ [0, 1/2] determines the fraction
of neighboring values to view as extreme. For example, if
f = 1/3, then ARC-P with parameter f removes the largest
and smallest one third of the neighboring values.
For describing the algorithm, let Fi(t) = ⌊fdi(t)⌋. When-
ever the normal nodes assume the f -fraction local model, at
most ⌊fdi(t)⌋ of node i’s neighbors may be compromised,
and the parameter used is f .2 The following steps describe
ARC-P with parameter f .
1) At time t, each normal node i obtains the values of its
in-neighbors, and forms a sorted list.
2) If there are less than Fi(t) values strictly larger (smaller)
than its own value, xi(t), then normal node i removes
all values that are strictly larger (smaller) than its own.
Otherwise, it removes precisely the largest (smallest)
Fi(t) values in the sorted list.3
3) Let Ri(t) denote the set of nodes whose values are
removed by normal node i in step 2 at time t. Each
normal node i applies the update4
x˙i(t) =
∑
j∈N in
i
(t)\Ri(t)
w(j,i)(t)
(
x(j,i)(t)− xi(t)
)
. (3)
The set of nodes removed by normal node i, Ri(t), is pos-
sibly time-varying. Thus, even if the underlying network is
fixed, ARC-P effectively induces switching behavior, which
can be viewed as the linear update of (2) with the rule given
in step 2 for state-dependent switching.
IV. FRACTIONAL NETWORK ROBUSTNESS
Network robustness captures a notion of local redundancy
of information flow in the network that is well suited for
scope of threat models with absolute bounds on the number
of adversaries in a normal node’s neighborhood [24]. For
the f -fraction local model, there is no absolute bound on
the number of neighbors that may be adversaries. Rather,
it stipulates a bound on the fraction of neighbors that can
be adversaries. Hence, for the f -fraction local model, we
require a fractional notion of robustness. First, we define a
p-fraction edge reachable set.
Definition 5: Given a nonempty digraph D and a
nonempty subset S of nodes of D, we say S is a p-fraction
edge reachable set if there exists i ∈ S such that |N ini | > 0
and |N ini \S| ≥ ⌈p|N ini |⌉, where 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. If |N ini \S| = 0
for all i ∈ S, then S is 0-fraction edge reachable.
A set S is p-fraction edge reachable, for p > 0, if it
contains a non-isolated node i (i.e., di > 0) that has at least
⌈pdi⌉ neighbors outside of S. The parameter p quantifies
the ratio of influence from neighbors outside S to neighbors
inside S for at least one node inside S. Note that the notion
of fraction edge reachability is also called cohesiveness in
the contagion literature [20].
To illustrate p-fraction edge reachability, consider the sets
S1, S2, and S3 in Figure 1. Each node in S1 has 3/5 of
its neighbors outside S1; so S1 is 35 -fraction edge reachable.
Node 8 has 5/6 of its neighbors outside of S2, and node
9 only has 4/5 of its neighbors outside of S2. Thus, S2
2Of course, if the scope of threat model assumed (i.e., at design time) is
not the true scope of threat, then ARC-P may fail to achieve consensus.
3Ties may be broken arbitrarily. However, it is required that the algorithm
is able to match the correct weights to the values kept.
4Note that if all neighboring values are removed, then x˙i(t) = 0.
Fig. 1. Graph for illustrating edge reachability properties.
is 56 -fraction edge reachable. Lastly, S3 is a non-isolated
singleton, so S3 is 1-fraction edge reachable.
The p-fraction edge reachability property is defined with
respect to a specific set of nodes. We now use this concept
to define a network-wide property as follows.
Definition 6 (p-fraction robustness): A nonempty, non-
trivial digraph D = (V , E) is p-fraction robust, with 0 ≤
p ≤ 1, if for every pair of nonempty, disjoint subsets of V ,
at least one of the subsets is p-fraction edge reachable. If D
is empty or trivial, then D is 0-fraction robust.
V. RESILIENT CONSENSUS ANALYSIS
We demonstrate in this section how fractional robustness
is a useful property for analyzing ARC-P with parameter
f under the f -fraction local model. More specifically, we
show that f -fraction robustness is necessary in the presence
of crash adversaries and 2f -fraction robustness is sufficient
in the presence of Byzantine adversaries. First, we consider
the safety condition.
Lemma 1: Consider the normal agent i ∈ N using ARC-
P with parameter f ∈ [0, 1/2] under the f ′-fraction local
(Byzantine) model, where f ′ ≤ f . Define Fi(t) = ⌊fdi(t)⌋.
Then, for each t ∈ R≥0,
B(mN (t)− xi(t)) ≤ fi,σ(t)(t, xN , x(A,i))
≤ B(MN (t)− xi(t)),
where B = β(n − 1 − mini∈N ,t≥0{Fi(t)}), which implies
that the safety condition of the CTRAC problem is ensured.
Proof: If no neighboring values are used, or all values
used are equal to xi(t) at time t, then fi,σ(t)(t, xN , x(A,i)) =
0, and the inequality holds. Therefore, assume at least one
value not equal to xi(t) is used in the update at time t, say
x(j,i)(t). Suppose x(j,i)(t) > MN (t). Then, by definition
j must be an adversary and x(j,i)(t) > xi(t). Since i uses
x(j,i)(t) at time t, there must be at least Fi(t) more agents
in the neighborhood of i with values at least as large as
x(j,i)(t). Hence, these agents must also be adversaries, which
contradicts the assumption of at most Fi(t) adversary agents
in the neighborhood of i at time t. Thus, x(j,i)(t) ≤MN (t).
Similarly, we can show that x(j,i)(t) ≥ mN (t). Since there
are at most n − 1 neighbors of i, at least Fi(t) values
are removed or equal to xi(t) (since di(t) > Fi(t)), and
w(j,i)(t) ≤ β for all j ∈ N ini (t), it follows that
B(mN (t)− xi(t)) ≤
∑
j∈N in
i
(t)\Ri(t)
w(j,i)(t)(x(j,i)(t)− xi(t))
≤ B(MN (t)− xi(t)).
Finally, the fact that any solution of (1) using (3) is contin-
uous combined with the above inequality implies the result.
It follows from Lemma 1 that MN (·) is nonincreasing and
mN (·) is nondecreasing, respectively. Therefore, if agree-
ment is achieved among the normal agents, then the values
of the normal agents must converge to a common limit. For
this reason, we focus on proving that the Lyapunov candidate
Ψ(t) = MN (t) − mN (t) vanishes asymptotically (i.e.,
agreement is achieved). We show that this Lyapunov function
decreases over sufficiently large time intervals whenever
the normal nodes update their values according to ARC-P,
provided the network is sufficiently robust. Before that, we
first provide a necessary condition for the crash model in
time-invariant networks.
A. Necessary Condition
Theorem 1: Consider a time-invariant network modeled
by digraph D = (V , E) where each normal node updates its
value according to ARC-P with parameter f ∈ [0, 1/2] under
the f -fraction local crash model. If CTRAC is achieved, then
D is f -fraction robust.
Proof: Suppose that D is not f -fraction robust. Then,
there exist nonempty, disjoint subsets S1,S2 ⊂ V such that
neither S1 nor S2 is f -fraction edge reachable. This means
that |N ini \ Sk| ≤ ⌊fdi⌋ for all i ∈ Sk, k ∈ {1, 2}. Suppose
the initial value of each node in S1 is a and each node in S2
is b, with a < b. Let all other nodes have initial values taken
from the interval [a, b]. Assume all crashing nodes behave
normally all the time. Then, using ARC-P with parameter
f , each node i in S1 removes the ⌊fdi⌋ (or fewer) values
greater than a from outside S1. Likewise, each node j in S2
removes the ⌊fdj⌋ (or fewer) values less than b from outside
S2. Therefore, each node in S1 keeps the value a and each
node in S2 keeps the value b for all t ≥ 0.
B. Sufficient Condition
We proved in Theorem 1 that f -fraction robustness is a
necessary condition for ARC-P with parameter f to achieve
CTRAC in time-invariant networks under the f -fraction
local crash model (and therefore necessary also for the
malicious and Byzantine models). We now show that p-
fraction robustness, with p > 2f , is sufficient for the f -
fraction local Byzantine model (and therefore, also sufficient
for the malicious and crash models).
Theorem 2: Consider a time-invariant network modeled
by digraph D = (V , E) under the f -fraction local Byzantine
model. Suppose each normal node updates its value accord-
ing to ARC-P with parameter f ∈ [0, 1/2). Then, CTRAC is
achieved if the network topology is p-fraction robust, where
2f < p ≤ 1.
Proof: We know from Lemma 1 that both MN (·) and
mN (·) are monotone and bounded functions of t. Therefore
each of them has a limit, denoted by AM and Am, respec-
tively. Note that if AM = Am, then CTRAC is achieved.
We prove by contradiction that this must be the case. The
main idea behind the proof is to use the gap between AM
and Am and combine this with a careful selection of subsets
of nodes to show that Ψ(t) will shrink to be smaller than
the gap AM − Am in finite time (a contradiction). To this
end, suppose that AM 6= Am (note that AM > Am by
definition). Since MN (t) → AM monotonically, we have
MN (t) ≥ AM for all t ≥ 0. Similarly, mN (t) ≤ Am for all
t ≥ 0. Moreover, for each ǫ > 0 there exists tǫ > 0 such that
MN (t) < AM + ǫ and mN (t) > Am − ǫ, ∀t ≥ tǫ. Define
constant ǫ0 = (AM −Am)/4 > 0.
Next, we define the sets of nodes that are vital to the proof.
For any t0 ≥ 0, t ≥ t0, ∆ > 0, and η > 0, define
XM (t, t0,∆, η)
= {i ∈ N : ∃t′ ∈ [t, t+∆] s.t. xi(t′) > MN (t0)− η}
and
Xm(t, t0,∆, η)
= {i ∈ N : ∃t′ ∈ [t, t+∆] s.t. xi(t′) < mN (t0) + η}.
We now proceed by showing that if we choose η and
∆ small enough, then no normal node can be in both
XM (t, t0,∆, η) and Xm(t, t0,∆, η) for any t0 ≥ 0 and
t ≥ t0. First, we require some generic bounds on the normal
node trajectories. For i ∈ N , we know from Lemma 1 that
for τ ∈ [t′, t],
x˙i(τ) =
∑
j∈N in
i
\Ri(τ)
w(j,i)(τ)
(
x(j,i)(τ) − xi(τ)
)
≤ B(MN (t
′)− xi(τ)),
whenever the derivative exists,5 where B = β(n − 1 −
mini∈N ,t≥0{Fi(t)}). Using the integrating factor eB(τ−t
′)
,
and integrating in the sense of Lebesgue over the time
interval [t′, t], we have
xi(t) ≤ xi(t
′)e−B(t−t
′) +MN (t
′)(1 − e−B(t−t
′)), ∀t ≥ t′.
(4)
By interchanging the roles of t and t′, we have
xi(t) ≥ xi(t
′)eB(t
′−t)+MN (t)(1−e
B(t′−t)), ∀t ≤ t′. (5)
Similarly, we can show that for i ∈ N ,
xi(t) ≥ xi(t
′)e−B(t−t
′) +mN (t
′)(1− e−B(t−t
′)), ∀t ≥ t′,
(6)
and
xi(t) ≤ xi(t
′)eB(t
′−t)+mN (t)(1−e
B(t′−t)), ∀t ≤ t′. (7)
Now fix η ≤ ǫ0 = (AM − Am)/4 and ∆ < log(3)/B, and
suppose i ∈ XM (t, t0,∆, η). Then ∃t′ ∈ [t, t+∆] such that
5The solutions of the normal nodes’ trajectories are understood in the
sense of Carathe´odory. Hence, it is possible that the derivative of the solution
does not exist on a set of points in time of Lebesgue measure zero.
xi(t
′) > MN (t0) − η. Combining this with (6), it follows
that for s ∈ [t′, t+∆],
xi(s) ≥ xi(t
′)e−B(s−t
′) +mN (t
′)(1 − e−B(s−t
′))
> (MN (t0)− η)e
−B(s−t′) +mN (t0)(1 − e
−B(s−t′))
≥ (AM − η)e
−B(s−t′) +mN (t0)−Ame
−B(s−t′)
≥ mN (t0) + (AM −Am)e
−B(s−t′)
−
AM −Am
4
e−B(s−t
′)
≥ mN (t0) +
3
4
(AM −Am)e
−B∆
> mN (t0) +
AM −Am
4
≥ mN (t0) + η,
where we have used the fact that ∆ < log(3)/B. Similarly,
using (5), it follows that for s ∈ [t, t′],
xi(s) ≥ xi(t
′)eB(t
′−s) +MN (s)(1 − e
B(t′−s))
> (MN (t0)− η)e
B(t′−s) +MN (s)(1− e
B(t′−s))
≥MN (s)− ηe
B(t′−s)
≥MN (s)−
AM −Am
4
eB∆
> AM −
3
4
(AM −Am)
≥ Am +
1
4
(AM −Am)
≥ mN (t0) + η.
Therefore, i /∈ Xm(t, t0,∆, η).
Similarly, with the given choices for η and ∆, if j ∈
Xm(t, t0,∆, η), then ∃t′ ∈ [t, t + ∆] such that xj(t′) <
mN (t0) + η. It follows from (4) that for s ∈ [t′, t+∆],
xj(s) ≤ xj(t
′)e−B(s−t
′) +MN (t
′)(1 − e−B(s−t
′))
< (mN (t0) + η)e
−B(s−t′) +MN (t0)(1− e
−B(s−t′))
≤MN (t0) + (η +mN (t0)−MN (t0))e
−B(s−t′)
≤MN (t0) +
(
AM −Am
4
− (AM −Am)
)
e−B(s−t
′)
≤MN (t0)−
3
4
(AM −Am)e
−B∆
< MN (t0)−
AM −Am
4
≤MN (t0)− η,
where we have used the fact that ∆ < log(3)/B. Finally,
using (7), it follows that for s ∈ [t, t′],
xj(s) ≤ xj(t
′)eB(t
′−s) +mN (s)(1 − e
B(t′−s))
< (mN (t0) + η)e
B(t′−s) +mN (s)(1− e
B(t′−s))
≤ mN (s) + ηe
B(t′−s)
≤ Am +
AM −Am
4
eB∆
< Am +
3
4
(AM −Am)
≤MN (t0)−
AM −Am
4
≤MN (t0)− η.
Thus, j /∈ XM (t, t0,∆, η). This shows that XM (t, t0,∆, η)
and Xm(t, t0,∆, η) are disjoint for appropriate choices of
the parameters.
Next, we show that by choosing ǫ small enough, we can
define a sequence of sets,
X kM , XM (tǫ + k∆, tǫ,∆, ǫk), k = 0, 1, . . . , N,
and
X km , Xm(tǫ + k∆, tǫ,∆, ǫk), k = 0, 1, . . . , N,
where N = |N |, so that we are guaranteed that by the N th
step, at least one of the sets contains no normal nodes. This
will be used to show that Ψ has shrunk below AM − Am.
Toward this end, let ǫ0 = (AM−Am)/4 and ∆ < log(3)/B.
Then fix
ǫ <
1
2
[ α
B
(1 − e−B∆)e−B∆
]2N
ǫ0.
For k = 0, 1, . . . , N , define ǫk = [ αB (1− e
−B∆)e−B∆]2kǫ0,
which results in
ǫ0 > ǫ1 > · · · > ǫN > 2ǫ > 0.
Observe that by definition, there is at least one normal node
in X 0M and X 0m (the ones with extreme values), and we have
shown above that all of the X 0M and X 0m are disjoint. The p-
fraction robust assumption (with p > 2f ) ensures that there
exists a (normal) node i in either X 0M or X 0m with at least
⌈pdi⌉ neighbors outside of either X 0M or X 0m, respectively.
For node i, at most 2⌊fdi⌋ of these values are thrown away
(with at most ⌊fdi⌋ of them as adversaries, under the f -
fraction local model, and at most ⌊fdi⌋ of these strictly
smaller, or larger, than node i’s value). Because p > 2f ,
it follows that ⌈pdi⌉ − 2⌊fdi⌋ ≥ 1. Therefore, at least one
normal value outside of i’s set (either X 0M or X 0m) is used.
Assume i ∈ X 0M has at least ⌈pdi⌉ neighbors outside of
its set. Then, at least one of the values from i’s neighbors
outside of X 0M is used for almost all t ∈ [tǫ, tǫ +∆]. Then,
x˙i(t) ≤ α(MN (tǫ)− ǫ0 − xi(t))
+ (B − α)(MN (tǫ)− xi(t))
≤ −Bxi(t) +BMN (tǫ)− αǫ0,
for almost all t ∈ [tǫ, tǫ +∆]. Using this, we can show
xi(tǫ +∆) ≤ xi(tǫ)e
−B∆ + (MN (tǫ)−
αǫ0
B
)(1− e−B∆)
≤MN (tǫ)−
α
B
(1− e−B∆)ǫ0.
Using this with (4) to bound xi(t) for t ∈ [tǫ+∆, tǫ+2∆],
we see that for all t ∈ [tǫ +∆, tǫ + 2∆],
xi(t) ≤MN (tǫ)−
α
B
(1− e−B∆)e−B(t−tǫ−∆)ǫ0
≤MN (tǫ)−
α
B
(1− e−B∆)e−B∆ǫ0
≤MN (tǫ)− ǫ1.
Thus, i /∈ X 1M . The next step is to show that j /∈ X 1m
whenever j is a normal node with j /∈ X 0m. Whenever
j /∈ X 0m, it means that xj(tǫ + ∆) ≥ mN (tǫ) + ǫ0. Using
this with (6) to lower bound xj(t) for t ∈ [tǫ+∆, tǫ+2∆],
we see that
xj(t) ≥ mN (tǫ) + ǫ0e
−B∆ ≥ mN (tǫ) + ǫ1.
Hence, j is also not in X 1m, as claimed. Likewise, we can
show using (4) that j /∈ X 1M whenever j is a normal node
with j /∈ X 0M . Therefore, if i ∈ X 0M uses at least one normal
neighbor’s value outside of its set, we are guaranteed that
|X 1M | < |X
0
M | and |X 1m| ≤ |X 0m|. Using a similar argument,
we can show that if i ∈ X 0m has at least ⌈pdi⌉ neighbors
outside of its set, we are guaranteed that |X 1m| < |X 0m| and
|X 1M | ≤ |X
0
M |.
Now, if both X 1M and X 1m are nonempty, we can repeat
the above argument to show that either |X 2m| < |X 1m| or
|X 2M | < |X
1
M |, or both. It follows by induction that as long
as both X jM and X jm are nonempty, then either |X j+1m | <
|X jm| or |X
j+1
M | < |X
j
M | (or both), for j = 1, 2, . . . . Since
|X 0m|+ |X
0
M | ≤ N , there exists T < N such that at least one
of X TM and X Tm is empty. If X TM = ∅, then MN (tǫ+T∆) ≤
MN (tǫ) − ǫT < MN (tǫ) − 2ǫ. Similarly, if X Tm = ∅, then
mN (tǫ + T∆) ≥ mN (tǫ) + ǫT > mN (tǫ) + 2ǫ. In either
case, Ψ(tǫ + T∆) < AM − Am and we reach the desired
contradiction.
We now extend the above result to time-varying networks.
Theorem 3: Consider a time-varying network modeled
by D(t) = (V , E(t)) under the f -fraction local Byzantine
model. Let {tk} denote the switching times of σ(t) and
assume that tk+1 − tk ≥ τ for all k. Suppose each normal
node updates its value according to ARC-P with parameter
f ∈ [0, 1/2). Then, CTRAC is achieved if there exists t′ ≥ 0
such that D(t) is p-fraction robust, where 2f < p ≤ 1, for
all t ≥ t′.
Proof: The proof follows the contradiction argument
of the proof of Theorem 2, but here we use the dwell time
assumption. In this case, let
∆ < min{log(3)/B, τ
N
}.
Fix
ǫ <
1
2
[ α
B
(1 − e−B∆)e−B∆
]2N
ǫ0,
and let t′ǫ ≥ 0 be a point in time such that MN (t) < AM +ǫ
and mN (t) > Am−ǫ for all t ≥ t′ǫ. Define t′′ = max{t′, t′ǫ}.
Then, associated to the switching signal σ(t), we define tǫ
as the next switching instance after t′′, or t′′ itself if there
are no switching instances after t′′. Since ∆ < τ/N , the
same sequence of calculations can be used (as in the proof
of Theorem 2) to show that Ψ(tǫ + T∆) < AM −Am.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper studies the continuous-time resilient asymptotic
consensus problem. The adversary models studied are om-
niscient and have a scope that is fractional in nature (i.e., at
most a fraction f of nodes in any normal nodes neighborhood
are assumed to be compromised). Under these assumptions,
we show that a fractional version of the Adversarial Robust
Consensus Protocol (ARC-P) achieves consensus among the
normal nodes if the network is 2f -fraction robust and only
if the network is f -fraction robust. Determining a tight
condition for these adversary models is a matter of future
work.
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